When sociable workers pay off: can firms internalize social capital externalities? by Ferreira-Lopes, A. et al.
 Repositório ISCTE-IUL
 
Deposited in Repositório ISCTE-IUL:
2019-03-29
 
Deposited version:
Post-print
 
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
 
Citation for published item:
Ferreira-Lopes, A., Roseta-Palma, C. & Sequeira, T. N. (2012). When sociable workers pay off: can
firms internalize social capital externalities?. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics. 23 (2), 127-
136
 
Further information on publisher's website:
10.1016/j.strueco.2012.01.004
 
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Ferreira-Lopes, A., Roseta-Palma, C. &
Sequeira, T. N. (2012). When sociable workers pay off: can firms internalize social capital
externalities?. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics. 23 (2), 127-136, which has been
published in final form at https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2012.01.004. This article may be used
for non-commercial purposes in accordance with the Publisher's Terms and Conditions for self-
archiving.
Use policy
Creative Commons CC BY 4.0
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in the Repository
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Serviços de Informação e Documentação, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL)
Av. das Forças Armadas, Edifício II, 1649-026 Lisboa Portugal
Phone: +(351) 217 903 024 | e-mail: administrador.repositorio@iscte-iul.pt
https://repositorio.iscte-iul.pt
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
When sociable workers pay o¤: can rms
internalize social capital externalities?
Alexandra Ferreira-Lopesy Catarina Roseta-Palmaz
Tiago Neves Sequeirax
January, 2012
Abstract
We use an endogenous growth model to contrast the socially optimal al-
location of human capital with the decentralized solution, in a context where
workers make the choices that determine social capital accumulation. As so-
cial capital is expected to increase productivity but is not traded in markets,
a positive social capital externality is identied. We discuss the possibility
that, in response to this externality, rms subsidize social capital accumu-
lation activities, incurring into additional costs that are recouped through
productivity gains. This reaction by rms may be seen as a justication for
some Corporate Social Responsibility actions targeted at workers, although a
full internalization of the externality does not look achievable in practice.
JEL Classication: M14, O15, O41, Z13.
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Social Capital, Human Capi-
tal, Economic Growth.
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1 Introduction
Worker productivity is crucial for economic growth. Traditional economic models
consider the role of physical capital and labour in production, whereas the impor-
tance of human capital accumulation, in a wider sense, has been the focus of en-
dogenous growth theory. Social capital is a fairly recent addition to growth models,
where it can represent the impact of trust and social networks on productivity and
hence on growth. Since there is no specic market for social capital, its decentral-
ized accumulation will generally not be optimal, which means that a social capital
externality exists. In fact, in a static world without capital accumulation, the rm
could adjust wages so as to induce workers to choose their time allocation optimally.
Thus, the social capital externality is essentially a dynamic phenomenon, in which
rms and households benet from an intangible investment for which a market does
not exist. Roseta-Palma et al [28] develop an endogenous growth model with natural
and social capital where the interaction between these types of capital is studied.
In this paper, on the other hand, we investigate whether the social capital external-
ity can act as an incentive for rms to increase their corporate social responsibility
(CSR) activities in response to the market failure. In this sense our work ts Heals
[17] suggestion that one of the roles of CSR is as "an institution that has evolved
in response to market failures, a Coasian solution to some problems associated with
social costs. Therefore, it is welfare-enhancing in all those sectors of economic
activity where private and social costs are misaligned. In particular, the author
specically refers to "improved human relations and employee productivity" as one
of the multiple benets of CSR. This is the aspect we explore in the present work.
It should be stressed that ours is not the rst attempt to link social capital and
corporate social responsibility. Sacconi and Degli Antoni [29] provide a conceptual
discussion of this relationship, described as a "virtuous circle that creates favorable
conditions for socio-economic development". Furthermore, these are multifaceted
concepts and we do not aim to provide a complete framework that could fully ex-
plain the relationship between them. For that, the reader is well-advised to head to a
recent book, edited by the same authors [31], whose chapters vividly illustrate both
the possible interconnections between the two notions and the range of methodolog-
ical approaches that can be brought to bear on the analysis. We do, however, o¤er
a short primer on the potential role of social capital in the context of an endogenous
growth model as well as a brief discussion of previous work that introduces various
aspects of CSR into economic literature.
Although there are many ways to dene social capital, the one that best adapts
to economic models, as noted by Sobel [33], is Bourdieus 1986 explanation: "So-
cial capital is an attribute of an individual in a social context. One can acquire
social capital through purposeful actions and can transform social capital into con-
ventional economic gains. The ability to do so, however, depends on the nature
of the social obligations, connections, and networks available to you. A similar
2
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idea is expressed in Lins notion of "investment in social relations with expected
returns" [22]. We interpret the concept as something that individuals must build
up through their choices and whose accumulation increases their utility as well as
their productivity, thereby beneting rms. For example, people might invest time
in building up or maintaining a network of people (e.g. by organizing a conference
or participating in a team-building corporate activity). In our model, social capital
is a single asset which enters consumer utility in a dynamic, representative-agent
economy, and we introduce the assumption that in order to accumulate this asset
agents incur an opportunity cost in terms of human capital use. In contrast, Sac-
coni and Degli Antoni [29] use a game-theoretic approach to discuss the various
dimensions of social capital, distinguishing cognitive elements, namely beliefs and
dispositions, from structural elements that are cooperative linkages between agents.
They propose that the general level of trust and cooperation, often associated with
the concept of social capital at least since Putnam et al [27] and Knack and Keefer
[21], should actually be seen as an e¤ect of other elements. Alternative approaches
to social capital include networks of relations, as in Lippert and Spagnolo [23], where
interactions between agents are modelled as repeated games with di¤erent channels
of information between players, and linked social-exchange and economic-exchange
games, as in Aoki [1], which proposes that social norms are a result of the joint
evolution of social networks and specic patterns of economic exchanges.
Corporate social responsibility (CSR), despite its prominence in management
theory and business practice, is also a di¢ cult concept to dene. For instance,
Lockett et al [24] suggest that even within the management literature CSR knowl-
edge can be described as "a eld without a dominant paradigm". Moreover, the use
of a given denition for CSR implies a normative choice regarding the goals of corpo-
rations. Many economists, famously led by Milton Friedman [16], have held the view
that corporations in competitive markets should only focus on prot-maximization,
as that is their purpose, enabling them to serve consumers as well as to provide
jobs. Linked to a traditional belief in the rationality of economic agents, so that
any protable actions are expected to be identied and implemented by competitive
rms, this view minimizes the potential role of CSR and even deems it a harmful
endeavour. Likewise, Jensen [19] defends maximization of the long-run value of the
rm, equivalent to the discounted value of the future prot stream, as the single-
valued objective that should be pursued, albeit taking into account the impact on
all the rms constituencies (stakeholders) so as to promote better management de-
cisions. He does recognize, however, that externalities hamper the maximization of
social welfare and recommends that Coasian solutions be found to correct for these
deviations. 1 Our model ts in this framework of analysis.
There has been much less development of CSR in the economic literature than
1Other popular views of CSR are stakeholder theory (see Freeman et al [14]) and the contrac-
tarian approach (which is described, among other approaches, in Sacconi et al [30]). A summarized
review of the competing theories can be found in Melé [25].
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in management, and most of what there is is microeconomic in focus. A few pa-
pers model CSR as an instance of private provision of public goods. Besley and
Ghatak [7] introduce caringconsumers who value the public good, whereas Baron
[4] adds manager and shareholder preferences as well, in a principal-agent frame-
work. Brekke and Nyborg [9] show that the existence of morally motivated workers
(who prefer to work at a greenrm and will have a higher productivity when they
do) can justify rmse¤orts to be socially responsible. There are also papers which
focus on the relationship between CSR and economic performance as measured by
existing productivity indicators (see Paul and Siegel, [26] and other articles in the
same issue of the Journal of Productivity Analysis). In this paper we explore the
role of CSR in growth models, a relatively neglected angle of analysis. The only
other works that we are aware of are Dam [12] and Dam and Heijdra [13], which
look at the implications for growth of socially motivated investors. The rst paper
shows that stock markets can deal with intergenerational environmental externali-
ties, while the second nds that the presence of socially responsible investors lower
the positive e¤ects on environmental quality of public abatement activities. We, on
the other hand, choose to focus on a di¤erent externality: the worker productivity
e¤ect. In particular, we assess whether CSR actions, undertaken by rms, can be
an incentive to social capital accumulation performed at the workers level. Such
a link has been previously mentioned in the management literature, which relates
CSR activities by the rm with socially and professionally motivated employees: for
example, Turban and Greening [35] focus on employee attraction, while Heslin and
Ochoa [18] describe the positive impact of CSR thus: "Besides enabling organiza-
tions to attract employees who are driven by socially conscious values, CSR can also
keep them engaged and eager to become increasingly valuable to the organization."
In the following section we present the basic equations of our dynamic model. In
section 3 we compare optimal allocations with the decentralized solution and identify
the social capital externality, then (section 4) we propose a way to model the impact
of CSR activities on social capital accumulation. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Model
In this section we present an endogenous growth model where production depends
on the accumulation of several types of capital, namely physical capital, human
capital, and social capital. The rst two are well-known elements of growth models,
but social capital has been introduced fairly recently. Like Chou [10], we propose in
our model that social capital contributes directly to the formation of human capital,
but we take a wider perspective of the potential benets generated by this asset:
we also assume that it a¤ects rmsproductivity by having a multiplicative e¤ect
on other inputs in the production function, which is coherent with Coleman [11]
("Just as physical capital and human capital facilitate productive activity, social
capital does as well."); and nally, we consider that consumers attribute utility
4
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to the overall level of social capital, to reect empirical research that suggests a
positive correlation between measures of social capital and well-being (Bjornskov
[8], Sarracino [32], Bartolini et al [6]).
Physical capital, KP ; is the physical asset base for production, and it is in turn
accumulated through production that is not consumed but rather invested. KP is,
as usual, subject to depreciation:
_KP = Y   C   PKP (1)
where Y denotes production of nal goods, C is consumption, and P represents
depreciation.
Human capital, KH ; which can be interpreted broadly as knowledge, is an essen-
tial part of the model since it will be driving growth, as is customary in endogenous
growth theory. Given that the stock of knowledge and skills can be applied in dif-
ferent ways, we divide human capital into several components, namely: HY ;which
represents the part of KH that is used in nal good production, HH ; which is ded-
icated to school attendance, and HS; which reects the skills that are relevant for
social capital accumulation. Considering that these distinct human capital activities
arent done cumulatively, so that an allocative choice must be made, we have:
KH = HY +HH +HS: (2)
From a dynamic point of view, human capital accumulation will come from schooling,
but we assume that the total amount of social capital, Ks; also provides a positive
contribution, since it a¤ects the educational outcomes that are achieved, as described
extensively by Coleman [11] and Teachman et al [34]. This e¤ect is also considered
in Chou [10].
_KH = HH + KS   HKH ; (3)
where HH are school hours,  > 0 is a parameter that measures productivity in
schooling,   0 measures the contribution of social capital to human capital ac-
cumulation, and H  0 is human capital depreciation. Note that this expression
models human and social capital as substitutes in the production of human capital.
On the other hand, as noted above, part of the existing human capital stock will
in turn be applied in social capital accumulation. We assume, furthermore, that the
current stock of social capital will have an impact, so that:
_KS = !HS + 
KS; (4)
where ! measures the productivity of human capital in social capital production
and 
 7 0 measures the dynamic e¤ect of social capital on its own accumulation,
which may be positive or negative. If 
 > 0 the existing stock of social capital could
keep growing without additional human capital, reecting the notion of virtuous
self-reinforcement, whereas if 
 < 0 there is a net depreciation e¤ect similar to
those of other capital stocks.
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The production of nal goods will require all capital stocks in the economy to be
used (physical, human, and social capital). Assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology,
each exponent is the production elasticity of the associated input. We maintain
the traditional assumption that there are constant returns to scale on the typical
factors (physical capital and human capital), but then append social capital as an
additional input, as a way to reect the current emphasis on the existence of a
positive connection between social capital and growth (see for example Knack and
Keefer [21], Whiteley [36]) we use:
Y = KPH

YK

S ;  +  = 1: (5)
Note that KP and KS fully contribute to nal good production, but only the
portion of human capital that is specically dedicated to production is considered,
since the remainder is used for di¤erent activities, as stated in equation (2).
Finally, as noted above we consider that, given the nature of social capital, con-
sumers will improve their welfare if there is more of it. Note that if this were not the
case, the positive externalities associated with social capital would be even larger
since households would choose lower investment in social capital. Household prefer-
ences in our model thus include social capital as an argument of the intertemporal
utility function, which will depend also on consumption:
U(C;KS) =

   1
1Z
0

CtK
 
St
  1

e tdt (6)
where  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,  is the preference for social
capital, and  is the utility discount rate, so that a higher  indicates more impa-
tient consumers. The t subscripts are dropped in the remaining sections for ease of
notation.
3 Results
3.1 Optimal Growth
Since social capital provides utility, while simultaneously acting as a production
input, yet has no market price, the decentralized equilibrium solution will be char-
acterized by market failure, i.e., aggregate welfare will not be maximized. In this
section we identify the social capital externality by comparing the optimal solution
to that which stems from the decentralized decisions of rms and individuals. We
begin by solving a social planners problem in order to characterize optimal growth.
The problem can be stated as the maximization of (6) subject to the production
function (5) as well as the transition equations for the di¤erent types of capital. It
gives rise to the following Hamiltonian function:
H = 
   1

CK S
  1

+ P
h
KPK

SH

Y   C   PKP
i
+ (7)
+ H [(KH  HY  HS) + KS   HKH ] + S (!HS + 
KS)
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where the j are the co-state variables for each stock Kj; with j = P;H; S: Consid-
ering choice variables C, HY , and HS, and equation (2), the rst order conditions
yield:
@U
@C
= P ; (8)
H = P
Y
HY 
; (9)
H =
S!

; (10)
as well as:
P   _P = P Y
KP
  P P ; (11)
_H
H
= + H   ; (12)
S   _S =

@U
@KS
+
PY
KS
+ H + S


; (13)
and the required transversality conditions. As usual, @U
@C
, @U
@KS
, represent the marginal
utilities of consumption and social capital, respectively.
Conditions (8)-(10) tell us that for each control variable marginal benets will
have to be equated to marginal costs for e¢ ciency to be achieved. For instance,
condition (8) balances the marginal utility of consumption with the shadow price of
physical capital (since one unit of production that is consumed is no longer available
for capital accumulation); likewise, condition (9) equates the shadow price of human
capital to its value in production, whereas condition (10) equate the shadow price
of human capital to its value in social capital accumulation.
On the other hand, conditions (11)-(13) show the factors inuencing the dynamic
evolution of the shadow prices for each one of the capital types. Namely, condition
(11) reects that giving up a unit of KP yields a benet (from the discount rate
and the avoided depreciation) as well as a loss equal to the value of the marginal
productivity of physical capital; condition (12) tells a similar story except the loss
is in the accumulation of human capital; condition (13) shows that, for each unit
of KS that is relinquished, the value foregone includes the direct impact on utility,
the value of the marginal productivity of social capital, and its contribution to both
human and social capital accumulation.
3.1.1 Optimal Growth Rates
At the steady state of the model, growth rates must, by denition, be constant, so
equation (1) tells us that KP , Y , and C all grow at the same rate. Furthermore, KS
and KH will be growing at a di¤erent rate, as will be shown below, while respecting
equations (3) and (4).
In the steady-state, we can obtain the human capital growth rate as follows.
From (9) we nd
_P
P
= gKH +
_H
H
  gY and using the result from equation (12), we
7
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can then replace the previous two equations into   1

gY + 
 
1  1


gKH =
_P
P
, which
we calculated from (8). The substitution yields:
1  1


gY + gKH

 

1  1


  1

= + H   : (14)
To simplify the above expression, we log-di¤erentiate equation (5), yielding:
gY = gKH

 + 
1  

: (15)
Since +
1  =
+

> 1, the growth rate of Y (and thus of C and KP ) will be larger
than the growth rate of human capital.
We can substitute the last expression in equation (14) to get the growth rate of
human capital:2
gKH =
   H   
1 +

+
1  +  
  
1

  1 : (16)
Substituting equation (16) in equation (15) we get the output growth rate:
gY =
(   H   )

+
1 

1 +

+
1  +  
  
1

  1 : (17)
Economic growth is driven by productivity and preference parameters and does not
have a scale e¤ect. This is consistent with previous literature on endogenous growth
models with human capital accumulation as in Arnold [2]. It is interesting to note
the positive e¤ect of the share of social capital in nal good production () and
the negative impact of the social capital weight in preferences ( ), as in this model
there is a utility trade-o¤ between consumption and social capital.
3.2 Decentralized Equilibrium
In the decentralized equilibrium both consumers and rms have choices to make.
Consumers are assumed to maximize their intertemporal utility function, which was
presented in equation (6) above:

   1
1Z
0

CtK
 
St
  1

e tdt
subject to the budget constraint:
:
a = (r   p)a+WHHY   C; (18)
where a represents the value of physical assets, r is the gross rate of return on
physical capital, andWH is the market wage. The market price for the consumption
good is normalized to 1. Since it is making an intertemporal choice, the consumer
2A superscript  means that we are working with variables at the optimal level.
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also takes into account equations (3)-(4), which represent human and social capital
accumulation. Moreover, consumers are aware of the partition between di¤erent
uses of human capital, equation (2), which implies that they take into consideration
that choosing social capital accumulation at a given moment comes at the expense
of lower work hours or human capital investment. First order conditions for the
consumer problem in the decentralized equilibrium can be found in Appendix A.
As for rms, these are assumed to be non-myopic prot maximizers. In par-
ticular, the rms dynamic prot maximization problem gives rise to the following
Hamiltonian:3
H = KPKSHY  WHHY   I + 
0
P [I   PKP ] + (19)
+ 
0
H [HH + KS   HKH ]
where the choice variables of the rm are HY and I. The rst order conditions
are:
WH =
Y
HY
; (20)

0
P = 1; (21)
as well as:
r =
Y
KP
; (22)
 H
0
H = (WH   H)
0
H   _
0
H ; (23)
where 
0
P and 
0
H are co-state variables for the stocks of physical and human
capital, respectively.
The markets for purchased production factors (human and physical capital) are
expected to be competitive. However, the rm cannot buy social capital, as there
is, in e¤ect, no market for it and it is hard to imagine direct payments for social
capital accumulation (see Section 4.1). Social capital is treated as exogenous by
the rm here, although it a¤ects production. Hence, consumer decisions will carry
social capital externalities.
From this problem we know that returns on purchased production factors equal
marginal productivities, as follows:
WH =
Y
HY
; (24)
r =
Y
KP
: (25)
3In this case, maximizing the present value of prots is equivalent to maximizing prot in each
period. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999: 67 - 70).
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In Appendix B we have calculated the growth rates of human capital and output
in the decentralized equilibrium, and they are shown to be the same as those for the
optimal solution. This is a feature of semi-endogenous models of endogenous growth
(Jones [20]) and of models of endogenous growth with human capital accumulation
and R&D (e.g. Arnold [3]). It results from the fact that in this model, long-run
growth is driven by human capital accumulation and that there are no externalities
directly associated with the human capital stock. However, in the following section
we show that there are human capital allocation distortions in the decentralized
equilibrium.
3.3 Distortions
Given the importance of human capital in growth models such as ours, in this
section we look at the distortions that arise in human capital allocation. The shares
of human capital allocated to the di¤erent sectors by the social planner are:
uY =
HY
KH
=

   H   !   


KS
KH

!

 
 
 
C
Y

+ 
 ; (26)
uS =
HS
KH
=

gKS   

!

KS
KH

; (27)
uH =
HH
KH
=
1

 
gKH + H
  


KS
KH

; (28)
where an expression for
 
C
Y

is given in Appendix C. The equations that are pre-
sented in this section provide a basis for a complete analysis of all the relationships
between the di¤erent capital stocks and also a basis for the comparison with the
decentralized equilibrium solution. All derivations are in Appendix D.
Using the restriction that uY + u

S + u

H = 1, we obtain the social to human
capital ratio that the social planner would choose:
KS
KH

=
1  1

 
gKH + H

( H !  
)
!
 ( (
C
Y )

+)
+

gKS 

!

  

: (29)
In a simplistic view, the shares are determined by the parameters that also deter-
mine the respective growth rates. Thus, a higher growth rate of output driven, e.g.,
by , would determine a higher allocation to the nal good production. Similarly, a
higher growth rate of social capital would determine a higher uS and a higher growth
rate of human capital would determine a higher uH : However a higher social capital
to human capital ratio would occur the lower the growth rate of human capital. The
combination of all these factors in general equilibrium would determine the above
allocations and ratio.
The shares of human capital allocated to the di¤erent sectors in the decentralized
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equilibrium are:4
uDEY =
HY
KH
=
   H   !   

!

h
 
 
C
Y
DEi KSKH
DE
; (30)
uDES =
HS
KH
=

gDEKS   

!

KS
KH
DE
; (31)
uDEH =
HH
KH
=
1

 
gDEKH + H
  


KS
KH
DE
; (32)
where an expression for
 
C
Y
DE
is also given in Appendix C and is shown to be equal
to
 
C
Y

. Again, we obtain the decentralized equilibriums social to human capital
ratio: 
KS
KH
DE
=
1  1

 
gDEKH + H

 H !  

!

h
 (CY )
DE
i + gDEKS  

!
  

: (33)
As mentioned above, growth rates are equal in the decentralized equilibrium and
in the optimal solution, so that the di¤erence between the two solutions is only seen
in the distortion in human capital allocations. Moreover, note that if we build a
static model without capital accumulation, the decentralized allocation of a given
level of knowledge between work, which is paid a salary, and social interactions,
which generate well-being while increasing productivity, there would not be an ex-
ternality because rms could simply adjust the market salary to ensure the optimal
level of social interaction. This highlights the fact that the social capital externality
is essentially a dynamic phenomenon.
Proposition 1 Due to a market failure in social capital, the social planner chooses
a higher social-human capital ratio than in the decentralized equilibrium. The socially
optimal choice is to allocate more human capital to social capital production and less
to nal good production and human capital accumulation than the agents do.
Proof. Comparing equations (29) and (33), we can see that the rst expression is
larger, given that there is a positive social capital externality. This is due to the
benecial impact of social capital in the production function ( > 0), which is not
taken into consideration in the decentralized equilibrium because there is no market
for social capital. Therefore, decentralized human capital allocation to social capital
accumulation (uS) will be lower than would be desirable, which can also be veried
comparing equations (27) and (31).
We give one example to illustrate that the size of the distortion in the allocation
of human capital to social capital accumulation can be signicant.
Example 1 Suppose we use a parametrization that considers a per capita economic
growth rate of gy = 0:0141, human capital depreciation rate of H = 0, the shares
4A superscript DE means that we are working with variables at the decentralized equilibrium
level.
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of physical, human and social capital in nal good production  = 0:18;  = 0:7 and
 = 0:08, respectively, the preference for social capital  =0:2, the e¤ect of social and
human capital on social capital accumulation 
 = 0:01 and =0:01, respectively, the
e¤ect of social capital on human capital accumulation ! = 0:01, the consumption to
output ratio C=Y = 0:89, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution  = 0:8, and
the discount rate  = 0:01: 5 This yields a share of social capital relative to total
human capital of uS = 5:4% for the planners allocation and u
DE
S = 3:8% for the
decentralized allocation. Moreover, if we change the parameters associated to human
and social capital in the production function, the distortion can be even more severe:
For instance, setting  =  = 0:41 and leaving all other parameters constant, the
model would imply a much larger distortion, with uS = 18:9% and u
DE
S = 5:9%.
4 Can Firms Induce a Better Social Capital Al-
location?
4.1 A New Decentralized Equilibrium
In order to achieve the optimal solution it would be tempting to suggest that rms
pay individuals to improve social capital. In particular, a payment of Y would carry
the decentralized equilibrium to the optimal solution (see Appendix E). However, it
is not realistic to suppose such a payment, because there is no functioning market
for social capital and it is not clear that such a market would be feasible or even
desirable. Unlike most environmental externalities, which are generally unintended
byproducts of consumption or production decisions and for which the attribution of
property rights is a route to solving the market failure in the absence of transaction
costs, the social capital externality carries a strong moral charge and its commod-
ication could be counterproductive. An instrumental expense by rms that was
seen by workers as an attempt to buy trust and commitment would probably crowd
out their intrinsic motivations, thus reducing rather than increasing spontaneous
trustworthiness between the rm and its workers (see for instance Frey and Jegen,
[15]).6
Alternatively, we propose that rms can use CSR activities to improve the e¤ec-
tiveness of social capital accumulation, so that even similar choices by individuals
would yield higher benets. The idea is that there is no purchase of social capital
as such, but rather an action that facilitates positive collaborations. Examples of
such activities are awareness-raising programs that communicate positive company
values to employees or community outreach engagements, organized with company
resources, where employee involvement is encouraged. These actions require a deci-
sion by the rm on the resources it wishes to spend on CSR, but through them the
5This parameter set is obtained from the benchmark exercise in Roseta-Palma et al. [28], where
each parameter value is justied from empirical evidence.
6We thank a referee for this point.
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rm enables workers to build social capital more successfully, by increasing valuable
cooperation networks or strengthening workerslevels of trust and sense of belonging
in the work environment. In the decentralized equilibrium model, these activities
will translate into direct costs for the rms that reduce instantaneous prot, but
then bring dynamic benets through an increase in the HS e¤ectiveness parameter
in the equation for accumulation of social capital:
_KS = !(1 + CSR)HS + 
KS: (34)
The rms dynamic prot maximization problem now gives rise to the following
Hamiltonian:
H = KPKSHY  WHHY   I   CSR + 
000
P [I   PKP ] + (35)
+ 
000
S [!(1 + CSR)HS + 
KS] + 
000
H [HH + KS   HKH ]
where the choice variables of the rm are HY , I, and CSR. The rst order
conditions are:
WH =
Y
HY
;

000
P = 1;
!HS
000
S = 1; (36)
as well as:
r =
Y
KP
;
Y
KS
+ 
000
S 
 + 
000
H = (! + 
)
000
S   _
000
S ; (37)
 H
000
H = (WH   H)
000
H   _
000
H ; (38)
where 
000
P , 
000
S , and 
000
H are the co-state variables for the stocks of physical, social,
and human capital, respectively. Condition (36) is new and shows the factors that
a¤ect CSR choices, namely by balancing the benet obtained through an additional
unit (given by its impact on KS accumulation) and its unit cost. Condition (37),
also new, is the corresponding co-state equation, which illustrates the multiple roles
of social capital, as in condition (13)
Moreover, the rst-order condition of the choice variable HS for the consumer
problem, presented in Appendix A, has now changed to reect the higher value of
human capital productivity in social capital production:

000
S =
aWH
!(1 + CSR)
: (39)
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The growth rates are equal to the ones calculated in the previous section, but the
shares in the decentralized equilibrium are now di¤erent (except for the allocation
of human capital dedicated to schools, uH):7
uDES =
HS
KH
=

gDEKS   

!(1 + CSR)

KS
KH
DE
; (40)
uDEY =
HY
KH
=
   H   !(1+CSR)   

!

h
 (1 + CSR)
 
C
Y
DEi KSKH
DE
: (41)
Although it is impossible to work out an expression for the value of CSR that
would fully equate the social to human capital ratio obtained in this model to the
optimal one derived in Section 3.3, so that a full internalization of the externality
is not achievable, we note that corporate social responsibility (CSR) can bring the
share of social capital closer to the optimal ratio. In particular, the value for CSR
that induces the optimal allocation of human capital to social capital activities, we
equate uS = u
DE
S and nd:
CSR =
(   H   
)  !
( + C
Y
)( + C
Y
)!
: (42)
Example 2 Using the values set in Example 1, one could calculate CSR=1.125,
which mean that CSR expenditures of 1.125 would represent an increase of 112.5%
in the productivity of individuals in accumulating social capital and would induce
an increase of 1.6% on the allocation of human capital to social capital activities.
Despite its benets, for a per capita GDP of Y=20000, this expenditure would only
represent 0.008% of the wage expenditures (Y ). In the alternative setting with
 =  = 0:41; CSR expenditures of 2.038 would represent an increase of 203.8% in
the productivity of individuals in accumulating social capital and would induce an
increase of 13% on the allocation of human capital to social capital activities. In
this case, this expenditure would represent 0.025% of the wage expenditures.
5 Conclusion
Recent analysis highlights social capital as one of the determinants of both produc-
tivity and well-being. In this paper we show that a positive externality can arise
from social capital. In particular, we look at the individual rms decisions in a
decentralized model, in a context where workers make the choices that determine
social capital accumulation. As social capital is expected to increase productivity
but is not traded in markets, there is an externality in the model. We compare the
human capital allocation patterns associated with a welfare-maximizing solution to
those achieved in a decentralized equilibrium, and nd that the decentralized level
7CSR is constant at the steady-state. The ratios
 
C
Y

and
 
C
Y
DE
are equal in this model, and
are also equal to the value presented in Appendix C.
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of social capital relative to human capital is, as expected, too low. Moreover, we
use a numerical example to show that the size of this distortion can be fairly large.
We then propose that, given the externality, it may be in the interest of the
rms to subsidize social capital accumulation activities, incurring into additional
costs (translated in CSR activities) that are recouped through productivity gains.
In the title of the paper, we ask whether rms could internalize social capital ex-
ternalities. Although a full internalization is theoretically possible, as shown in
Appendix E, this would require the creation of a market for social capital, an en-
deavour which is hard to fathom and could actually be counterproductive given the
nature of the asset, as direct monetary compensation could well crowd-out intrinsic
worker motivation. Instead we model CSR as an expense that yields improvements
in the e¤ectiveness of social capital accumulation. This new model provides a way
to approach optimal human capital allocations, although not a full internalization
of the social capital externality. Our work thus constitutes a rst attempt to relate
rmsCSR decisions to social capital from the point of view of endogenous growth
theory. Further research should be dedicated to the introduction of other facets of
CSR and social capital, such as those discussed in [31].
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A First Order Conditions for the Decentralized
Equilibrium
The choice variables for the consumers are C, HH , and HS, so the rst order condi-
tions for the consumer problem yield:
@U
@C
= a (A.1)

00
H =
aWH

(A.2)

00
S =
aWH
!
(A.3)
as well as:
_a
a
= + P   r (A.4)
_
00
H = 
00
H   (aWH   
00
HH) (A.5)
_
00
S = 
00
S  

@U
@KS
+ 
00
H + 
00
S


(A.6)
where a is the co-state variable for the budget constraint, and 
00
H and 
00
S are
co-state variables for the stocks of human and social capital, respectively.
B Growth Rates in the Decentralized Equilibrium
In the steady-state we can obtain the human capital growth rate of the decentralized
equilibrium as follows. By using equation (A.5) and replacing it in
_
00
H

00
H
=
_a
a
+ g
W
,
which we get by log-di¤erentiating equation (A.2), we nd _a
a
=  + H      gW .
After log-di¤erentiating equation (24) we get gW = gY   gKH . Substituting this last
equation in the previous one and introducing both in   1

gY +  
 
1  1


gKH =
_a
a
,
which we calculated from (A.1), we get:
1  1


gY + gKH

 

1  1


  1

= + H    (B.1)
By log-di¤erentiating the production function (5) we get:
gY = gKH

 + 
1  

(B.2)
Substituting this last expression into (B.1) we get:
gDEKH =
   H   
+
1  +  
  
1

  1+ 1 (B.3)
By substituting equation (B.3) into (B.2) we nd:
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gDEY =
(   H   )

+
1 


+
1  +  
  
1

  1+ 1 (B.4)
These growth rates are equal to the ones that we found in the social planner
problem, as discussed in the main text.
C Consumption-Output Ratios
Now we also demonstrate the relationship between the consumption to output ratio
in the decentralized equilibrium and in the social planner solution. We use this
expression in the calibration of the model.
From equation (1) we get:
_KP
KP
=
Y
KP
  C
KP
  P (C.1)
Also, from this equation we get gKP = gY = gC because the growth rates have to
be constant in steady state. Since we have shown that (gKP = gY = gC)
 = (gKP =
gY = gC)
DE the left hand-side of equation (C.1) is equal in the social planner and
in the decentralized equilibrium and P is a constant.
In the social planner problem by transforming equation (8) we obtain -
_P
P
=
  1

gC +  (1  1 )gKS . Replacing this last equation in equation (11) we get:
Y
KP

= + P +
1

gC    (1  1

)gKS (C.2)
Since we have shown that gKP = g
DE
KP
, hence

Y
KP
  C
KP

=

Y
KP
  C
KP
DE
.
Using the fact that C
KP
can be written as C
Y
Y
KP
and putting Y
KP
in evidence, we
obtain: 
Y
KP

1  C
Y

=

Y
KP
DE 
1  C
Y
DE
(C.3)
From the decentralized equilibrium, using (25) we note that

Y
KP
DE
= r. Using
equations (A.1) and (A.4) we get:
Y
KP
DE
= + P +
1

gC    (1  1

)gKS (C.4)
Hence 
Y
KP

=

Y
KP
DE
(C.5)
Now substituting (C.5) into (C.3), we get:
C
Y

=

C
Y
DE
(C.6)
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We can determine the value of
 
C
Y

dependent on known values by substituting
equation (C.2) into (C.1) and using Y
KP
  C
KP
=

Y
KP
  
1  C
Y

to obtain:

C
Y

=

C
Y
DE
=
gKH
h
1

  1

+
1 

+  

 
1

  1i+ p  1   1+ 
+p

+ gKH
h
1


+
1 

+  

 
1

  1i (43)
D Human Capital Shares
D.1 Social Planner
To obtain the share of human capital allocated to production in the social plan-
ner, we rst use equation (10) which gives us: H =
S!

and by substituting this
expression into equation (9) we get:
P =
HY S!
Y
(D.1.1)
We know that @U
@C
= P by equation (8) and we also know that @U@KS =  
@U
@C
C
KS
,
hence @U
@KS
=  P
C
KS
. Substituting (D.1.1) in this last expression we get:
@U
@KS
=  
HY S!
Y
C
KS
(D.1.2)
By equation (10) we get that
_H
H
=
_S
S
, which by equation (12) is equal to
 + H   . After substituting this last expression and also (D.1.2) into equation
(13) and dividing the referred equation by S we nally obtain (26).
We get the share of human capital allocated to school time (32) from equation
(3) and the share of human capital allocated to investing in social capital (27) from
equation (4).
D.2 Decentralized Equilibrium
To obtain the share of human capital allocated to production in the decentralized
equilibrium, we rst use equation (A.3) which gives us:
a =

00
S!
WH
(D.2.1)
We know that @U
@C
= a by (A.1) and we also know that @U@KS =  
@U
@C
C
KS
, hence
@U
@KS
=  a
C
KS
. Substituting (D.2.1) in this last expression we get:
@U
@KS
=  

00
S!
WH
C
KS
(D.2.2)
By the substitution of (A.2) into (A.3) and by log-di¤erentiating we get that
_
00
H

00
H
=
_
00
S

00
S
, which by equation (A.5) is equal to  + H   . After substituting this
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last expression and also (D.2.2) into equation (A.6) and dividing this equation by

00
S we get:
   H   !

  
 =  !
WH
C
KS
(D.2.3)
We know by (24) that WH =
Y
HY
and after substituting this expression into
(D.2.3) we get the expression for the share of human capital allocated to production
as in (30) in function of KS
KH
.
The share of human capital allocated to school time (32) and the share of human
capital allocated to investing in social capital (31) are equal to the social planner
allocations despite the di¤erences in KS
KH
between both solutions and they are
obtained in the same way as in the social planners problem. The equilibrium and
optimum levels for KS
KH
as in (33) is obtained using 1 = uS + uH + uY :
E Social Capital Wage
If the rm could pay a wage for social capital, equal to WS, the budget constraint
would be:
:
a = (r   p)a+WHHY +WSKS   C (E.1)
The modications in terms of rst-order conditions for the decentralized equilib-
rium problem will be only in equation (A.6):
_
00
S = 
00
S  

@U
@KS
+ aWS + 
00
H + 
00
S


(E.2)
In the rm problem instantaneous prot would be:
 = KPK

SH

Y  WHHY   rKP  WSKS (E.3)
and prot maximization would have one extra condition:
WS =
Y
KS
(E.4)
The share of human capital dedicated to the social capital production in the de-
centralized equilibrium (uDES ), calculated in a manner equivalent to that of Appendix
D.2, would now be equal to equation (27), the share of human capital dedicated to
the nal good production in the decentralized equilibrium (uDEY ) would now be equal
to equation (26), the share of human capital dedicated to the human capital accu-
mulation in the decentralized equilibrium (uDEH ) would now be equal to equation
(28) and the externality would be fully internalized.
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